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The issue addressed in this study is whether propositional integration and world-
knowledge inference can be distinguished as separate processes during the compre-
hension of Dutch omdat (because) sentences. “Propositional integration” refers to
the process by which the reader establishes the type of relation between two clauses
or sentences. “World-knowledge inference” refers to the process of deriving the
general causal relation and checking it against the reader’s world knowledge. An
eye-tracking experiment showed that the presence of the conjunction speeds up the
processing of the words immediately following the conjunction, and slows down
the processing of the sentence final words in comparison to the absence of the
conjunction. A second, subject-paced reading experiment replicated the reading
time findings, and the results of a verification task confirmed that the effect at
the end of the sentence was due to inferential processing. The findings evidence
integrative processing and inferential processing, respectively.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Reinier Cozijn, Tilburg School


































476 COZIJN, NOORDMAN, VONK
The central question in this study is whether propositional integration and world-
knowledge inference are two separate processes during the comprehension of
because sentences. An example of such a because sentence is (1), adapted from
Crothers (1979):
(1) History is not a science because in history particular facts are more
important than causal laws.
The conjunction because segments the sentence into a main and a subordinate
clause. On the basis of the meaning of because, one understands that the two
clauses express a consequence and a cause, and that they can be integrated in
a causal link: The relation between “history not being a science” and “facts
being more important than causal laws” is a causal relation. By “propositional
integration” in these because sentences, we refer to the process by which the
comprehender establishes the type of relation—in this case, a causal relation
that exists between the two propositions expressed by the two clauses. However,
understanding can go beyond simply establishing that there is a causal relation.
Listeners and readers can achieve a deeper understanding of the causal relation
by making a world-knowledge inference that underlies the because sentence.
The inference in this example can be characterized as follows: A sentence “p
because q” implies that there exists a generalized, causal relation “if q then p.”
In this example, the inference is as follows: If in a discipline particular facts
are more important than causal laws, then that discipline is not a science; or, by
modus tollens: In science, particular facts are not more important than causal
laws. And, assuming that in the context of a science discussion causal laws
and particular facts are not equally important, the inference is as follows: In
science, causal laws are more important than particular facts. This inference is
the major premise in a syllogism. Making the inference amounts to deriving
this premise and matching it to the comprehender’s world knowledge. This
can be accomplished in at least two ways, depending on the comprehender’s
knowledge. If comprehenders already have knowledge about science, fact, laws,
and the relations among these concepts, this knowledge will be activated, and the
inference will be checked against it. In this case, the inference will be accepted as
a true statement: The causal relation is justified with regard to world knowledge.
If comprehenders lack this knowledge, they will understand that the speaker or
writer suggests to draw the inference; and they will conclude that, apparently,
in science, causal laws are more important than facts. In this case, the inferred
information is added to their knowledge base. The process of checking or adding
knowledge is called a world-knowledge inference.
The difference between integration and inference and the representations

































INTEGRATION AND INFERENCE 477
(2) History is not a science although in history particular facts are more
important than causal laws.
If understanding only consists of the integration process, the comprehender
understands almost the same information in understanding sentence (2) as in
understanding sentence (1). The two propositions (“History is not a science,”
and “In history, particular facts are more important than causal laws”), and the
fact that there is a relation between the propositions, are the same in both
sentences; only the type of relation in (1) and (2) differs. The relation in
(2) is a concessive relation. The inference process, therefore, should lead to
an underlying proposition opposite to the one in sentence (1). The underlying
(false) proposition in (2) is that, in science, particular facts are more important
than causal laws. For a deep and appropriate understanding of sentence (2), the
underlying proposition is matched against world knowledge and appears, then, to
be false. Therefore, the propositional integration process in the sentence requires
the construction of a relation internal to the representation, and the inference
process requires a relation with a model of the world. We come back to this
distinction in the General Discussion.
There is some experimental evidence that the integration process and the in-
ference process in understanding because sentences can indeed be differentiated;
although, at the time, the results of these experiments were not interpreted in
this way. Consider, for example, an experiment of Noordman, Vonk, and Kempff
(1992), who used expository texts consisting of 6 to 10 complex sentences on
not well-known topics1 (e.g., propellants in spray cans) that contained because
sentences as in (3):
(3) Chlorine compounds make good propellants because they react with
almost no other substances.
The inference triggered by this sentence is that propellants must not react
with the material in the spray can. If readers make the inference while reading
sentence (3), Noordman et al. (1992) predicted the reading time for the because
clause in (3) to be shorter when the preceding text contained a sentence that
expresses the information that has to be inferred, as in (4), than when the
preceding text did not contain this sentence:
(4) Propellants must not combine with the product in the spray can.

































478 COZIJN, NOORDMAN, VONK
After reading the text, readers had to verify statements with respect to the
text, one of which being an inference verification statement. Noordman et al.
(1992) predicted that if the inference is made during reading the because clause,
the inference verification statement requires the same verification time whether
sentence (4) was present or not in the text.
The results were just the opposite. The reading time for sentence (3) when
sentence (4) was present earlier in the text did not differ from the reading
time for that sentence when sentence (4) was absent, and the verification time
for the inference was shorter when sentence (4) was present than when it was
absent. The results indicated that readers did not make the inference online,
but made the inference later when requested in the verification task. Therefore,
readers must have stored in their discourse representation that there was a causal
relation between the clauses; otherwise, they would have been unable to verify
the causal relation. Thus, the results showed that the integration process must
have taken place during reading, but the inference process did not.
The experimental results were unexpected, but it is important to note what
the task and the materials were in this experiment: Participants read expository
texts on unfamiliar topics, and they just had to read in their normal way—that is,
without a specific reading task. That a reading task affects inference-making was
clear from results of two additional experiments (Noordman et al., 1992). In one
experiment, participants read the same texts, but were instructed to read them
so as to be able to detect inconsistencies. In this case, a difference in reading
times for sentence (3) was found between the two conditions and no difference
in verification times for the verification statement. This pattern of results indi-
cated that the inferences were made online. In a second experiment, without a
verification task, participants received a particular reading goal formulated as a
question before reading, such as “How do spray cans work?” Again, a reading
time difference for sentence (3) in the two conditions was obtained, indicating
that the inferences were made online.
In another study (Noordman & Vonk, 1992; Simons, 1993), the instructions
were simply to read, but the knowledge of the readers was varied. Experts in
economics and non-experts read economic texts with because sentences. The
economic concepts were familiar to both the experts and the non-experts; the
relations between the concepts, however, were familiar only to the experts.
Evidence for online inferences was obtained for the experts. The non-experts
did not make the inferences online, but they were able to verify the causal
relation after reading the text. Therefore, the non-experts must have stored a
causal relation between the propositions. The results for the non-experts again
give evidence for the distinction between integration and inference.
The results can be interpreted in terms of different representations readers
construct in understanding these sentences. In the Noordman et al. (1992) exper-
































INTEGRATION AND INFERENCE 479
the two clauses. The representation that the readers construct of a sentence, such
as (3), then consists of the following text propositions (Fletcher & Chrysler,
1990; Kintsch, 1998):
1. Chlorine compounds make good propellants.
2. Chlorine compounds react with almost no other substances.
3. Because (2, 1).
However, readers in the more demanding task, as well as readers who are
experts (Noordman & Vonk, 1992), made the inferences during reading, whereas
the other readers did not make the inference during reading. For readers in the
more demanding task, this meant that they added the inferred proposition as
new information; for readers who were experts, this meant that they checked
the inferred proposition against their knowledge base. For these two groups of
readers, the representation of the sentence contains, apart from Propositions 1,
2, and 3, an additional knowledge proposition: Propellants should not react with
other substances.
The Noordman et al. (1992) and Noordman and Vonk (1992) experiments
offered some evidence for the differentiation between integration and inference
processes. However, propositional integration and world-knowledge inference
could not be identified as separate processes during the comprehension of the
sentences on the basis of the sentence reading times.
Millis and Just (1994) collected data during reading in a study that in-
vestigated the role of because in understanding causal clauses. It should be
noted, however, that they did not make the distinction between propositional
integration and world-knowledge inference. They used the term integration as a
superordinate category, comprising inferences. In the sentences they presented,
the conjunction was either present or not. Among the data they collected were
probe recognition times to the verb from the first clause, reading times of the
second clause, answering times, and answering accuracy for comprehension
questions posed after the sentence had been read. The presence of because
decreased the probe recognition times at the end of the second clause. In addition,
the accuracy to the comprehension questions was greater, and the answering
times for these questions shorter, when the conjunction because was present
than when it was absent. The conjunction decreased the reading time of the
second clause, except the reading time for the last word in the clause, which
showed an increase in reading time. The quicker reading in case the conjunction
was present indicates, according to Millis and Just, that readers waited until
the end of the sentence to integrate the clauses. They interpreted their results
as supporting what they proposed as the “delayed reactivation hypothesis”: “A
connective reactivates the content of the first clause when the end of the sentence
































480 COZIJN, NOORDMAN, VONK
This delayed reactivation hypothesis is supported by the reading time results in
only one of their experiments.
The study by Millis and Just (1994) raises the question of what kind of
process they exactly investigated. They did not investigate whether inferences
were made: The questions that were asked concerned the first clause or the
second clause, and not the relation between the clauses. Consequently, no test
of inferences was involved. In continuation of the Millis and Just study, Millis,
Golding, and Barker (1995), using lexical decision times for inference words,
did obtain evidence for inference processes. However, they did not differentiate
between integration and inference. With respect to integration, Millis and Just
assumed that it takes place at the end of the sentence because “integration
requires both clauses to be simultaneously active in working memory” (p. 144).
However, in our conception of integration, it can occur as soon as the reader
processes the conjunction.
Another question raised by Millis and Just’s (1994) study is how robust their
reading time data are. In the first experiment, a decrease in reading time of the
second clause—except the last word—and an increase in reading time for the last
word were found. For Experiment 2, no reading time data are reported; in Exper-
iment 3, the reading time for the last word was not longer, but shorter, when the
conjunction was present (for the most plausible sentences); and. in Experiment 4,
the effects on the reading times were not significant by conventional standards. In
addition, Mouchon, Ehrlich, and Loridant (1999) did not replicate the decrease
in reading time for the middle segment and the increase for the last segment of
the second clause as obtained in Experiment 1 by Millis and Just. A limitation
of both studies is that isolated sentences were used and that participants had
to perform quite a few tasks that may have been confusing, and may have led
to results that are difficult to interpret. Moreover, in some conditions of the
experiments by Millis and Just, the causality of the relations was far-fetched.
We want to substantiate the findings of Millis and Just’s first experiment with a
more natural reading task using target sentences embedded in texts.
The aim of our experiments is to collect further experimental evidence for
the differentiation between a propositional integration process and a world-
knowledge inference process during sentence processing. To investigate online
inferential processing, texts were used that contained a causal relation that
was expressed either as a main clause and a subordinate clause connected
by the conjunction because (in Dutch, omdat, which, like because, indicates a
subordinate causal clause) or as two main clauses without a conjunction. Familiar
causal relations were used because, as indicated earlier, it has been shown that
familiarity is a prerequisite for making the causal inference online. A second
prerequisite for this kind of inference is the presence of the conjunction (Cozijn,

































INTEGRATION AND INFERENCE 481
To gain insight in the integration and inference processes during sentence
processing, the reading times were measured not for entire clauses, but for parts
of the clauses, as indicated in the Method section. It was expected that the
presence of the conjunction has two effects on the processing of the causal rela-
tion. First, the conjunction facilitates the integration process. Readers understand
consecutive sentences not as separate sentences, but try to integrate them accord-
ing to, for example, the “nextness” principle by Ochs (1979) and the principle
of continuity (“Readers assume, by default, that continuity is maintained”) by
Segal, Duchan, and Scott (1991, p. 32), and there is abundant empirical evidence
since Kintsch and Van Dijk (1978) that readers relate consecutive sentences.
The propositional integration process can start as soon as the second clause is
presented. If the first word of the second clause is a conjunction, integration
is facilitated. Therefore, the reading times of the words in the sentence after
the conjunction should be shorter when the conjunction is present than when it
is absent. Second, the conjunction elicits the inference that justifies the causal
relation. This inference process can start as soon as sufficient information about
the causal relation in the second clause has become available. Therefore, the
reading times later in the second clause should be longer when the conjunction
is present than when it is absent.
The first experiment used the eye-movement registration technique to obtain,
unobtrusively, a temporally fine-grained picture of the reading times of the
causal sentences. The second experiment used a self-paced reading method to
measure the reading times on the same texts; and, more important, exploited a
verification task by which the reading time results later in the second clause can
be interpreted in terms of inferential processing.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, the reading times were measured on short narrative texts that
contained a causal relation. The stories dealt with everyday situations, and the
causal relations in the stories were familiar to the readers. Each story was
followed by a verification statement that served to encourage careful reading.
Method
Participants. Forty-two students of Nijmegen University (all with normal,
uncorrected vision) were paid to participate (28 women and 14 men, ranging in
age from 20–27). Of these participants, 40 were entered into the analysis. The

































482 COZIJN, NOORDMAN, VONK
Materials. Thirty texts were written about everyday topics. Each text con-
sisted of seven (complex) sentences: four introductory sentences, one target
sentence, and two closing sentences. The target sentence consisted of a conse-
quence in the first clause and a cause in the second clause. In one condition,
the clauses were connected by the conjunction because; in this condition, the
target sentence consisted of a main clause and a subordinate clause. In the
other condition, there was a full stop between the clauses. An example of a
target sentence is as follows: “On his way to work he experienced a long delay,
because there was a large traffic jam on the highway.” This sentence expresses
the conclusion (he was delayed) and the minor premise (he was in a traffic jam)
of a syllogism. The major premise of the syllogism is the information that can
be inferred: A traffic jam leads to a delay. Table 1 presents an example of an
experimental text with the target sentence in the two conditions: conjunction
present and conjunction absent.
Two preliminary materials studies, one sentence completion study and one
plausibility judgment study, were conducted to select 24 texts for the experiment.
The aim of these preliminary studies was to obtain texts with sentences that
expressed plausible causal relations that are part of general world knowledge. In
the sentence completion study, 49 participants read the text up to and including
TABLE 1
Example of an Experimental Text (and the Literal English Translation)
in Experiment 1
De heer Smit verliet rond half acht het huis. Hij moest op
zijn werk een belangrijke vergadering voorzitten. Daarom was hij
van plan om van tevoren de papieren goed door te nemen. Hij haalde
zijn auto uit de garage en reed weg. Hij ondervond een flinke
A [ vertraging, omdat |1er |2een lange file was ontstaan |3op de snelweg.| Hij ] /
B [ vertraging. |1Er |2was een lange file ontstaan |3op de snelweg.| Hij ]
was blij dat hij wat eerder was vertrokken. Hij hield er niet van
om te laat te komen.
Mister Smith left at about seven thirty the house. He had, at
work, to chair an important board meeting. That is why he
had planned to study the papers thoroughly in advance. He fetched
his car from the garage and drove off. He experienced a long
A [ delay, because |1there |2was a large traffic jam |3on the highway.| He ] /
B [ delay. |1There |2was a large traffic jam |3on the highway.| He ]
was glad that he had left a bit earlier. He did not like
to be late.
Note. Causal relation sentences (in italics) are presented in two conditions: with
the causal conjunction because (A) and without the causal conjunction because (B).
































INTEGRATION AND INFERENCE 483
the conjunction because, and completed the last sentence with what they believed
to be the most plausible cause for the event described in the first clause. For
18 texts, the causes produced by 70% or more of the participants corresponded
to the cause in the originally written texts. For the other texts, slight changes
were made so as to make the original cause more plausible in the text. In the
second materials study, 26 participants judged the plausibility of the causes of
the 30 texts. Twenty-four texts were selected2 that had a mean plausibility score
higher than 3.5 on a 4-point scale. The overall average plausibility score was
3.90 (SD D 0.016).
The clauses expressing the causes in the causal relation sentences were
divided into three regions (see Table 1). The logic of dividing the causal clause
into three regions was as follows: Region 1 consisted of the first word after
the conjunction; or, in the condition where the conjunction was absent, of the
first word of the second clause. This region was not of particular interest to the
causal processing of the sentence, but should show the effect of sentence initial
processing (Haberlandt, 1984; cf. Vasishth, 2003), and was, therefore, separated
from Region 2. Region 2 represented the middle part of the second clause. This
part of the clause was central to the meaning of the second clause. It expressed
the cause of the causal relation. This region was rather large because, in Dutch,
the word order in the condition with the conjunction differs from the word order
in the condition without the conjunction. For instance, the word order in the
middle region of the sentence in Table 1, which reads “[omdat er] een lange file
was ontstaan” if the conjunction is present, changes into “[Er] was een lange
file ontstaan” if the conjunction is absent. Region 2, therefore, always contained
the same words, but in a different order. Region 3 concluded the second clause
with a prepositional phrase that was not central to the meaning of the clause.
In addition to the 24 experimental texts, 24 filler texts were included. These
texts resembled the experimental texts in topics and style, but contained conjunc-
tions other than because: although, but, while, after, when, and for. Furthermore,
the filler texts varied in the number of sentences, from 6 to 11.
Finally, for each text, a verification statement was generated. For the experi-
mental texts, the statements contained the information that could be inferred from
the causal relation sentence, and were always true. For instance, the verification
statement for the example text in Table 1 read, “A traffic jam leads to a delay.”
The verification statements for the filler texts were always false.
Design. A list was created in which the experimental texts and the filler
texts were distributed semi-randomly. The two experimental conditions, conjunc-
tion present or absent, were distributed semi-randomly over the 24 experimental
texts within the list, resulting in 12 experimental items with the conjunction and
































484 COZIJN, NOORDMAN, VONK
12 experimental items without the conjunction. Since each text was presented
to a participant in only one of the two conditions, a second list was created
in which the conditions were mirrored. A text that contained the conjunction
in List 1 did not contain the conjunction in List 2, and vice versa. Participants
were randomly assigned to a list.
Apparatus. The stimuli were presented at a refresh rate of 72 Hz on a
19 in. monitor. The experiment was carried out on two personal computers, one
for stimulus presentation and one for data recording. Horizontal and vertical
eye movements of the right eye of the participant were sampled at a rate of
200 Hz by an Amtech ET3 infrared pupil reflectance eye tracker (Katz, Müller,
& Helmle, 1987). The eye tracker has a spatial resolution of 5 to 10 min of
arc—that is, approximately 0.25ı of visual angle.
Participants were restricted in their head movements by the use of a chin
rest, a forehead rest, and a bite bar (with dental impression compound). The
distance between the participant’s eye and the monitor screen was 59 cm. At
this distance, the display area used for text presentation subtended 22ı of visual
angle horizontally and 12ı vertically. The texts were presented in graphics mode
(800  600) in a black, non-proportional font (Courier New, 12 pt.) and double-
spaced on a light grey background. Each character subtended approximately
0.28ı of visual angle.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of two blocks of 24 items. Each block was preceded
and followed by a 12-point calibration routine. Between the blocks, there was
a break, allowing the participant to take a rest.
Participants were instructed to read the texts thoroughly, but quickly, in order
to understand them. After each text, they had to verify a statement about the
text. They were told that they should not make errors, and could take as long as
they needed to verify the statement. The experiment started with three practice
items. Each item consisted of an asterisk, followed by a text and a verification
sentence. The asterisk remained on the screen until the participant was ready to
start reading the next text. At the press of a button, the text started at exactly the
same position as the asterisk. When the text had been read, the button had to be
pressed. The text disappeared, and a statement was presented for verification.
After verification, a 4-point recalibration routine was run, and the asterisk for
the next item appeared on the screen, indicating that the procedure started anew.
The layout of the texts was left-aligned. Because the measurements of fixation
times at the beginning and the end of a line of text are blurred due to making
a return sweep, the regions of interest—that is, the middle and the final regions
































INTEGRATION AND INFERENCE 485
line, but not at the beginning or the end of a line. The total duration of the
experiment was 1 hr.
Results
From the eye-movement data, two first-pass measures were calculated: forward
reading time (Vonk & Cozijn, 2003) and go-past reading time (W. S. Murray,
2000). The main interest in this study lies in first-pass reading processes, where
first-pass reading is defined as the time spent on a region from the moment
it is visited for the first time, and has not been skipped earlier. This assures
the capturing of early and immediate reading processes. Forward reading time
is defined as the time spent on a region until it is left in a forward direction.
Go-past reading time is defined as the time spent on a region until the region
is left in a forward direction, including the time spent on all regressions to
earlier parts of the text. The calculation of these measures is performed by
aggregating the durations of the fixations on a region, including the durations
of the intermittent saccades. The decision to include saccade durations in the
computation of aggregated measures is justified because language processing
continues during saccades (Irwin, 1998; Vonk & Cozijn, 2003).
The forward reading time is a measure of ongoing reading. This measure
is prone to suffer from lack of observations because it does not include cases
where the reader has decided to jump back in the text. The go-past reading time
takes these cases of regression into account. This results in more observations in
the go-past reading times than in the forward reading times, but also in a greater
variance and, therefore, reduced power of the statistical test. The two measures
capture different reading strategies when a reader encounters a difficulty in the
text. The forward reading time mainly captures sustained processing behavior,
whereas the go-past reading time mainly captures rereading behavior.
From the eye-movement data for the target sentences, saccades and fixations
were calculated. Saccades were determined using a velocity threshold algorithm
with a starting threshold of 0.30ı per second and an ending velocity of 0.10ı
per second. The minimum saccade amplitude was set to 0.20ı. Eye movements
with an amplitude below this value were not considered to be saccades. Fixations
were defined as the intervals between saccades. The calibration data, as well as
the resulting saccades and fixations, were checked for errors and anomalies. The
fixations were automatically assigned to the words in the text by the program
Fixation (Cozijn, 2006).
For each region of interest, analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were carried
out on the reading times with participants as a random variable (F1) and with
items as a random variable (F2). The F1 analysis contained conjunction (with the
levels present and absent) as a within-subjects factor and participants group (with
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within-subjects factor and items group (with 2 levels) as a between-subject factor.
Where applicable, confidence intervals (CIs) around contrasts were computed
according to Bird (2002). Reading times belonging to items on which the
participants had made a verification error (5.7% of the data; 4.8% and 6.7%
in the conditions with and without conjunction, respectively), as well as outliers
based on participants and item means (on 2.0 SDs), were excluded from the
analyses. Apart from these excluded observations, there were some missing data
as a result of skipping or blinks. Because all regions were separately analyzed
for each of the two dependent measures, the percentages of valid observations
are reported per region.
Forward reading times. The mean forward reading times, ANOVAs, 95%
CIs, and the percentages of valid observations are shown in Table 2. There were
only a few observations in Region 1, and there were no effects. Region 2, the
middle region of the second clause, revealed an effect of conjunction. The region
was read faster if the conjunction was present than if it was absent. In Region 3,
the final part of the second clause, the presence of the conjunction had an effect
in the F1 and a marginal effect in the F2. The results indicated that, contrary
to Region 2, the region was processed more slowly if the conjunction had been
present than if it had been absent. ANOVAs were carried out for Regions 2 and 3
combined. These regions formed two levels of a new factor, region. The analyses
revealed a significant interaction of region with conjunction: F1(1, 38) D 13.95,
TABLE 2
Mean Forward Reading Times (in Milliseconds), Their Analyses of Variance,
and 95% Confidence Intervals around Contrasts as a Function of Conjunction
(Present or Absent) for Regions 1, 2, and 3 in Experiment 1
Region
Conjunction 1 2 3
Present 214 (31) 589 (184) 427 (98)
Absent 235 (61) 666 (159) 389 (93)
Percentage of observations 22.4 78.1 75.8
F1 (df; F) 1, 26; 2.03 1, 38; 9.12* 1, 38; 11.83*
F2 (df; F) 1, 16; 2.42 1, 22; 13.67* 1, 22; 3.64#
Min F0 (df; F) 1, 41; 1.10 1, 59; 5.47* 1, 35; 2.78
d (in milliseconds) 21 77 38
95% confidence interval  3.68, 46.31 25.54, 128.69 15.73, 60.51
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Percentages of observations per region are shown
below the means.
































INTEGRATION AND INFERENCE 487
p < .05; F2(1, 22) D 10.55, p < .05; Min F0(1, 50) D 6.01, p < .05, attesting
to the opposite effects of conjunction in the two regions.
Go-past reading times. The mean go-past reading times, the ANOVAs,
95% CIs, the percentages of observations, and the percentages of regressions
are shown in Table 3.
In Region 1, there again were only a few observations. However, in contrast
to the analyses of the forward reading times, the conjunction had a significant
effect: The region was read faster if the conjunction was present than if it was
absent. A similar effect was found in Region 2: The region was read significantly
faster if the conjunction was present than if it was absent. In Region 3, the
effect of conjunction was significant as well: Reading times were longer if the
conjunction was present than if it was absent. Finally, the combined analyses of
Regions 2 and 3 showed a significant interaction between region and conjunction:
F1(1, 38) D 28.75, p < .05; F2(1, 22) D 17.63, p < .05; Min F0(1, 47) D 10.93,
p < .05.
TABLE 3
Mean Go-Past Reading Times (in Milliseconds), Their Analyses of Variance,
and 95% Confidence Intervals around Contrasts and Percentages of Regressions for
Regions 1, 2, and 3 as a Function of Conjunction (Present or Absent) in Experiment 1
Region
Conjunction 1 2 3
Present 263 (74) 649 (221) 512 (134)
Absent 338 (123) 749 (192) 448 (132)
Percentage of observations 31.4 91.1 89.8
F1 (df; F) 1, 34; 10.36* 1, 38; 14.83* 1, 38; 14.62*
F2 (df; F) 1, 21; 15.54* 1, 22; 14.70* 1, 22; 6.82*
Min F0 (df; F) 1, 54; 6.22* 1, 55; 7.38* 1, 22; 4.65*
d (in milliseconds) 75 100 64







Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Percentages of observations per region are shown
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Regressions. Regressions occurred relatively often. For Regions 2 and 3,
the percentages of regressions were 14.6% and 16.2%, respectively. If one takes a
closer look at the regressions, it seems that they were not equally distributed over
the conditions in this experiment. In Table 3, it can be seen that for Regions 1
and 2, most regressions occurred in the condition where the conjunction was
absent. The regressions in Region 3 showed a reverse pattern: There were more
regressions if the conjunction was present. These patterns are in line with the
notion that regressions may reflect deeper processing. However, statistically, no
clear effects of conjunction emerged: in Region 1, F1(1, 44) < 1 and F2(1,
38) D 3.348, p D .075; in Region 2, F1(1, 50) < 1 and F2(1, 30) < 1; in
Region 3, F1(1, 60) D 8.953, p < .01 and F2(1, 42) D 2.270, p D .139.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 showed that the reading times of the middle part
of the causal clause that contained the causal information were shorter, and the
reading times of the final part of the sentence were longer if the conjunction
was present than if it was absent. These results were obtained in the analyses
of the forward reading times, as well as in those of the go-past reading times,
indicating that the influence of the conjunction is unrelated to the processing
strategy of the readers.
The results are in line with the reading times of the first experiment of
Millis and Just (1994). However, in the present study, participants read the texts
in a more natural way. The eye-movement registration technique ascertained
accurate, but also unobtrusive, measurements of reading times; and the target
sentences were not presented in isolation, but were embedded in short narratives.
Readers were, thus, naive with respect to the status of the sentences in the
experiment. Therefore, it can be concluded that the reading times in this study
are an accurate reflection of the time readers take to process the sentences.
The main question is how the reading pattern may be explained. As mentioned
earlier, Millis and Just (1994) attributed the decrease in reading time to a delay
in processing, and the increase to the reactivation of the first clause and its
integration with the second clause into the overall sentence representation. In
our view, there is no reason to delay the processing of the second clause until
the end of the sentence is reached. On the contrary, the causal conjunction
indicates how the second clause should be integrated with the first, and this
information helps the reader in integrating the words in the second clause
into the sentence representation. The conjunction speeds up processing the
beginning of the subordinate clause. However, when reaching the end of the
sentence, the reader is slowed down by the conjunction: Readers have to make
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The presence versus absence of the conjunction is confounded with word
order and sentence structure. In Dutch, the word order of the second clause—
when the conjunction is present—differs from the word order in the second
sentence—when the conjunction is absent. The question is whether word order
might have accounted for the results. A study reported by Koornneef (2008)
suggests that this is not the case. Koornneef conducted reading experiments with
the Dutch causal conjunctions omdat and want. Want is like omdat a backward
causal conjunction (i.e., it signals that the cause follows the consequence).
However, unlike omdat, it is a coordinating conjunction, and the want clause
has the same word order as a main clause. Koornneef investigated the influence
of implicit causality information in interpersonal verbs on the processing of
pronouns in sentences such as, David bood Linda excuses aan omdat/want hij
: : : ‘David apologized to Linda because he : : : ’, and measured the reading times
after omdat and after want on the words following the pronoun in the second
clause. The difference in word order did not have any influence on the effect of
implicit causality he found on these words. Therefore, it is very unlikely that
the difference in word order is responsible for the differences in reading times
we found in our experiment.
The absence versus presence of the causal conjunction is also confounded
with the difference between two main clauses versus a main clause and a
subordinate clause. Several remarks should be made. First, it may be argued that
information in a subordinate clause is regarded as less important than information
in a main clause and, therefore, receives less attention during reading. However,
no evidence is obtained for this position: The reading time for the second
sentence did not differ from the reading time for the corresponding part of
the subordinate clause (excluding the conjunction and, in both conditions, the
first word). An additional ANOVA showed that neither the difference of 39 ms
for the forward reading times was significant (95% CI D  10.51, 88.49), nor the
difference of 37 ms for the go-past reading times (95% CI D  25.98, 100.59).
Therefore, the syntactic difference between the main second sentence and the
subordinate clause did not affect the reading time. Only the distribution of the
reading times over the parts of the clauses in the two conditions differed.
Second, one may argue that, in the case of two main clauses, there are
sentence wrap-up processes at the end of the first sentence and that, therefore,
the wrap-up processes at the end of the second sentence are shorter than for the
complex sentence. In this case, the reading times for the first sentence should be
longer than the reading time for the corresponding part of the complex sentence.
However, this was not the case. An ANOVA on the reading times for the first
sentence and the corresponding part of the complex sentence, not reported in
the Results section, showed that the differences were nonsignificant: 4 ms for
the forward reading times (95% CI D  47.17, 38.31) and 47 ms for the go-past
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Finally, and more importantly, instead of attributing the different distributions
of the reading times in the second sentence/clause to integration and inference,
one might argue that words in the middle of a sentence are read faster than
identical words at the start of a sentence (Region 2), and that the wrap-up
for a complex sentence is longer than for a simple sentence (Region 3). The
explanation for Region 2, however, is not very likely because if there is any
evidence for an effect of serial position of words in a sentence on the reading
time, it is for the first word (Haberlandt, 1984; cf. Vasishth, 2003), and the
first word in both conditions was not included in Region 2. Moreover, both
the conjunction and the full stop are segmentation markers, after which a new
syntactic structure starts. Therefore, the comparison is not really between the
words in the middle and the start of a sentence. The explanation for Region 3
in terms of sentence wrap-up is unlikely, as has been argued in the previous
paragraph. To substantiate our interpretation of the data in this region in terms
of inferences, we should demonstrate that the increase of reading times at the
end of the sentence is actually due to inferential processing. As mentioned in
the introduction, evidence for making the inference online may be obtained
from the combined results of a reading task and a verification task in which the
inferential information has to be verified as fast as possible (see also Singer
& Halldorson, 1996; Singer, Halldorson, Lear, & Andrusiak, 1992; Singer,
Harkness, & Stewart, 1997). The combination of an increase in reading time
at the end of the sentence and a decrease in verification time, as a result of the
presence of the conjunction, can be interpreted as evidence for online inferential
processing. Because the verification task in this experiment was only used to
make sure that participants read the texts carefully, no verification times were
obtained that, in combination with the reading times, could serve to identify
inferences.
Therefore, we conducted a second experiment in which participants read
the same texts, but now had to verify inferential statements as fast as possible
immediately after the text. If readers make the causal inference online if the
conjunction is present but not if it is not, the verification of the inference after
the text should be faster if the sentence contained the conjunction than if it did
not. This result would qualify the reading time difference at the end of the causal
relation sentence as a result of inferential processing.
EXPERIMENT 2
In Experiment 2, the same texts were used as in Experiment 1. In contrast to
Experiment 1, the participants had to judge, as fast as possible, a verification
statement after each text. The statements of the experimental texts contained the
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were measured in a self-paced reading technique, with small windows consisting
of one or a few words.
Method
Participants. Forty-six students from Nijmegen University were paid to
participate (32 women and 14 men, ranging in age from 18–25). Six participants,
who had made four or more verification errors on experimental items, were
excluded from the analyses; therefore, the data of 40 participants were analyzed.
Materials and design. The same texts were used as in Experiment 1. The
texts were partitioned into small parts consisting of one or a few words, which
were consecutively presented to the reader as readable text, whereas the rest of
the text was masked by dashes. The regions of interest (Regions 1, 2, and 3;
see Table 1) were presented in parts. For each text, a verification statement was
generated. For the experimental texts, the statements contained the information
that could be inferred from the causal relation sentence—that is, the major
premise of the syllogism. For instance, the verification statement of the text in
Table 1 read, “A traffic jam leads to a delay.” The verification statements of
the experimental texts were always true. For the filler texts, similar verification
statements were created. However, these statements were not related to causal
inferential processing, and were always false. The design of Experiment 2 was
the same as that of Experiment 1.
Procedure
The readers were instructed to read the texts thoroughly, but quickly, in order to
understand them. They were told that they had to judge a verification sentence
after each text, and that they had to give their judgment as fast as possible,
but without making errors. The texts were presented on a computer display.
The responses to the reading task and the verification task were registered by a
response panel with three buttons, the middle button for reading the texts and
the outer buttons for the responses in the verification task. Before the actual
presentation of the text, a signal consisting of the words “NEW TEXT” was
shown on the screen. When the participant pressed the middle button on the
response panel, the words disappeared and the text appeared with the first line
at the position of the signal. The texts were presented with a self-paced reading
method. Only one part of a sentence in the text was readable; and the remainder
of the text, with the exception of spaces and punctuation characters, was replaced
by dashes. When the middle button was pressed, the part that had just been read
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the reader from looking back in the text. When the last part had been read, the
text disappeared from the screen and the word “VERIFICATION” appeared. It
remained on the screen for 1 s, during which the participants moved their index
fingers to the right-hand “true” and the left-hand “false” buttons. The participants
had to indicate, as fast as possible, whether the verification sentence was true
or false with respect to the text they had just read by pressing the appropriate
outer button. The verification time was defined as the time from the beginning
of the presentation of the verification statement until the button-press on one
of the outer buttons. When the verification response had been given, the signal
“NEW TEXT” appeared, indicating the start of a new text.
Results
Reading times. The reading times were analyzed in two ANOVAs: one
with participants as a random variable (F1) and one with items as a random
variable (F2). The F1 analysis contained conjunction (with the levels present
and absent) as a within-subjects factor and participants group (with 2 levels)
as a between-subject factor. The F2 analysis contained conjunction as a within-
subjects factor and items group (with 2 levels) as a between-subject factor.
Reading times of texts with an error on the verification task (7.0%; 7.1% and
6.9% in the conditions with and without conjunction, respectively) were excluded
from the analyses.
ANOVAs were performed on the reading times of Regions 1, 2, and 3 of the
second clause of the target sentence. The important regions were the middle part
of the second clause, Region 2, and the final part of the second clause, Region 3.
For all analyses, outliers exceeding 2.0 SDs from the participant and item means
within condition were excluded (0.1% for Region 3). The mean reading times,
their ANOVAs, and CIs are given in Table 4.
The analyses of Regions 1 and 2 showed an effect of conjunction: The reading
times of these regions were shorter if the conjunction was present than if it was
absent. In the analyses of Region 3, the last part of the second clause, there was
also an effect of conjunction: The reading times of this region were longer if
the conjunction was present than if it was absent.
Verification times. The same two ANOVAs, with the same factors, were
performed on the verification times as on the reading times (see Table 4).
Verification times of texts with an error on the verification task (7.0%) were
excluded from the analyses. The data were checked for outliers exceeding
2.0 SDs from the participant and the item means within condition. No outliers
were found.
There was an effect of conjunction: Verification times were shorter when the
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TABLE 4
Mean Region Reading Times (in Milliseconds) for Regions 1, 2, and 3;
and Mean Verification Times (in Milliseconds), Their Analyses of Variance, and
Confidence Intervals as a Function of Conjunction (Present or Absent) in Experiment 2
Region
Conjunction 1 2 3 Verification
Present 377 (50) 632 (153) 581 (123) 2317 (406)
Absent 414 (51) 671 (179) 547 (112) 2406 (467)
F1 (df; F) 1, 38; 41.80* 1, 38; 11.68* 1, 38; 8.74* 1, 38; 11.42*
F2 (df; F) 1, 22; 25.94* 1, 22; 7.45* 1, 22; 5.17* 1, 22; 15.81*
Min F0 (df; F) 1, 47; 16.01* 1, 47; 4.55* 1, 46; 3.25# 1, 59; 6.63*
d (in milliseconds) 37 39 34 89
95% confidence interval 25.57, 48.97 16.08, 62.72 10.81, 57.35 35.78, 42.58
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
*p < .05. #p D .075.
Discussion
Although a less natural reading task was used and participants were required to
perform a verification task as fast as possible, the results of the reading times
analyses in this experiment were similar to those of Experiment 1. The total
reading times of the second clauses with or without the conjunction did not
differ, as tested in an additional ANOVA (5 ms; 95% CI D  31.57, 42.21); but
the processing of the middle part of the second clause, Region 2, took less time;
and the processing of the final part of the sentence, Region 3, took more time if
the conjunction was present than if it was absent. The effect found in the middle
part of the second clause supported the notion that the conjunction facilitates
sentence integration. It indicates to the reader how the two clauses should be
integrated, and facilitates the processing of the words in the causal clause and
their incorporation into the sentence representation. The effect in the final part
of the sentence was assumed to be due to inferential processing: Readers make
a world-knowledge inference by which the causal relation is justified. In this
experiment, this claim was corroborated by the results of the verification task in
which participants had to verify, as fast as possible, statements containing the
inferential information: The results showed that participants were faster to verify
the inferential information if the conjunction had been present in the text than if it
had not. The conjunction elicited the inference to be made during the processing
of the causal sentence, making its verification after the text easy. The combined
results of the reading task and the verification task converge to the conclusion
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of both experiments can be summarized as follows: The presence
of the conjunction because speeds up the reading of the words immediately
following the conjunction, and slows down the reading of the last part of
the subordinate clause. These results give support for two separate processes
during reading: propositional integration and world-knowledge inference. First,
the conjunction signals the way in which the words in the second clause have
to be integrated into the sentence representation—namely, as a cause of the
consequence in the first clause. Second, the conjunction indicates that there is
a general causal relation that underlies the because sentence—that is, the major
premise of a syllogism. The inference consists in deriving the causal relation
expressed by the sentence and checking it against the knowledge of the world,
thus justifying the causal relation. The effects have been observed in reading a
target sentence that was embedded in a context comprising several sentences.
Such a discourse better reflects normal reading circumstances than sequences of
two sentences, as used in many experiments (e.g., Millis & Just, 1994; Mouchon
et al., 1999).
In our experiments, the integration process and the inference process exhibit
a chronological order. The integration process manifests itself quite early in
the sentence, as soon as the conjunction has been encountered. In case of
because sentences, the conjunction directs the reader to process the information
in the subordinate clause in a causal sentence structure. The inference process
manifests itself later in the sentence. However, this may not be interpreted as
if the inference process is delayed. Just as integration occurs as soon as the
information to be integrated is available, inferential processing can occur as soon
as the information required for the inference is available. Given the content of
the sentences used in these experiments, the inference can be made as soon
as the information in the middle part of the clause is available. Only then can
the matching against world knowledge take place. One may conclude that the
integration and inference processes are immediate, incremental, and data-driven
(cf. Kempen & Hoenkamp, 1987).
Experimental evidence for the different processes of integration and inference
has also been obtained in experiments by Cozijn, Commandeur, Vonk, and
Noordman (2011) in studies using a visual world paradigm. Listeners were
presented with implicit causality verbs, such as felt sorry, in Dutch because
sentences, as in, “The camel felt sorry for the octopus after the exam, because
he could not get a pass mark for the work.” Simultaneously, a visual display
was presented with a drawing of the two protagonists (camel and octopus)
and a distractor item (a piece of paper with a pencil representing the exam).
The pronoun in these sentences is syntactically ambiguous: It can refer both
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integration function: It indicates a causal relation, and signals that the subordinate
clause has to be interpreted as the expression of the cause of the event in
the main clause. The interpersonal verb in “x felt sorry for y” has an implicit
causality bias toward y: Readers prefer to attribute the cause of “felt sorry for”
to the object, and not to the subject, of this verb. The integration function of
because facilitates the processing of the words in the causal clause and the
incorporation into the sentence representation. In combination with the causal
bias of the interpersonal verb, this will lead the reader to make a co-referential
relation between the octopus and he. This was what the eye-movement data of
Cozijn et al. indeed showed: a preference to look at the octopus right after the
pronoun. A second effect was obtained at the end of the sentence. As argued in
this article, the understanding of the conjunction because requires an inference:
the derivation of a major premise and matching it to world knowledge. In this
example, this inference is, “A person who cannot get a pass mark is felt sorry
for.” This inference can be made as soon as the information in the subordinate
clause is available. Our knowledge about exams is that not getting a pass mark
is a suitable reason for being felt sorry for by someone else. Evidence for that
inference was indeed obtained at the end of the sentence: When the sentence
was congruent with the verb bias, as in “because he could not get a pass mark
for the work,” participants started looking at the correct referent (octopus) at an
earlier moment than participants looked at the correct referent (camel) when the
sentence was incongruent, as in “because he could not give a pass mark for the
work,” in which case, world knowledge had to redress the pronoun assignment.
We do not claim that our conclusions with respect to the understanding
of the because sentences generalize to integration and inferences in general.
However, we can speculate whether our results generalize to other conjunctions.
A characteristic of our because sentences is that a general relation between
the facts expressed by the clauses can be derived. This is true for other causal
conjunctions and causal connectives as well, such as therefore, so, and that
is why, as in, “John is a linguist; that is why he does not know much about
statistics.” Also, in sentences with a concessive conjunction and a contrastive
conjunction that express a denial of expectation, a general causal relation can
be derived. Examples are, “Although John is a linguist, he knows much about
statistics,” and “John is a linguist, but he knows much about statistics.” The
expectation is based on an assumed relation between linguists and not knowing
much about statistics. This relation is denied with respect to John. In these
kinds of sentences, we predict the same integration (speeding up) and inference
(slowing down) effects as we found for the because sentences. However, this
prediction is not easy to prove. For instance, it is not very surprising to find
shorter reading times after a contrastive conjunction, if these times are compared
with a condition in which the conjunction is absent, because the sequence of two
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the following sequence (from J. D. Murray, 1995): “Rudy and Tom laughed with
each other on the bus to the amusement park. They didn’t speak to one another
for the rest of the day.” Without linguistic marking, the denial of expectation
in the second sentence is quite unexpected, and most certainly will lead to
longer reading times. The reason is that we are inclined to interpret sequences
of sentences that are not connected by a conjunction in a causal way, but not in
a concessive or contrastive way.
The conjunction but can also express a semantic opposition, as in, “John is
small, but Pete is tall.” There is no general relation underlying this sentence,
as in our causal sentences. Therefore, we do not predict a world-knowledge
inference effect, but we do predict a propositional integration effect. This can
be tested by manipulating the presence of the conjunction (the conjunction but
can be omitted in a semantic opposition).
Sentences with a temporal connective (e.g., before, after, or when) and sen-
tences with an additive connective (e.g., and) are frequently interpreted in a
more informative way than the literal meaning allows for. Levinson (1983)
formulated the principle of informativeness: “[R]ead as much into an utterance
as is consistent with what you know about the world” (pp. 146–147). In the
sentence, “He turned on the switch and the motor started,” the conjunction and
will be interpreted in a temporal and causal way (see also Oversteegen, 1996).
Similarly, a causal interpretation is possible for temporal connectives, as in,
“After Mary had played tennis for two hours, she was exhausted.” Therefore,
if the temporal conjunctions are understood in a causal way, then we predict a
propositional integration effect and a world-knowledge inference effect for these
sentences.
It should be noted that we only studied causal sentences that consisted of two
clauses, both of which expressed a state of affairs in the world. Accordingly, the
relations were content relations and not epistemic relations (Sweetser, 1990; for
the same distinction in different terms, see Halliday & Hasan, 1976; Sanders,
Spooren, & Noordman, 1992; Traxler, Sanford, Aked, & Moxey, 1997). An
epistemic causal relation, such as, “John is not at his work, so he must be ill,”
expresses a conclusion of the speaker, and this conclusion is based on a content
causal relation (if you are ill, you are not going to your work). Epistemic relations
require more processing time than content relations (Noordman, 1979, pp. 65–
112; Traxler et al., 1997). In understanding an epistemic causal relation, both
the underlying content causal relation and the embedding epistemic proposition
(from knowing : : : , you may conclude that : : : ) have to be processed. If the
content causal relation is processed, one may predict that in processing the
epistemic sentence, both the integration process and the causal inference process
take place.
In this article, we made a distinction between the propositional integration
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sentences. The experimental results in this study indicate that propositional
integration and world-knowledge inference are indeed two identifiable processes
in understanding because sentences. We argue that this distinction corresponds
to the distinction between relations internal to the representation and relations
with a model of the world—a distinction that is rather fundamental in the study
of language.
Understanding a discourse implies that the relations between parts of the text
are made, as well as the relations between the text and a model of the world.
There are texts for which establishing a relation between sentences is rather
straightforward, but establishing the relation with the world is not so obvious.
An example is the beginning of a novel:
Always again that dream of a happy family. They have arrived in the country of
the soft winters and the warm summers and enjoy a meal in the open air, in a patio
surrounded by grapes or under the light green of a translucent acacia. (Smabers,
2009, p. 5)
The two sentences are related to each other in the internal representation of the
discourse by means of a referential relation between they and family. However,
it is not clear how the sentences relate to the world and what mental model
should be constructed. The dimensions of the world model—such as persons,
time, and place—still have to be filled in (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). This
example illustrates the distinction we make between the two kinds of relations.
Similarly, when Johnson-Laird (1983) discussed the comprehension of discourse,
he argued that the reader not only identifies relations in the discourse, such as
referential relations, but also evaluates whether the information in the discourse
corresponds to the world. With respect to this latter aspect, Johnson-Laird
referred to plausibility: “Plausibility depends on the possibility of interpreting the
discourse in an appropriate temporal, spatial, causal, and intentional framework”
(p. 371). Guenthner (1989) made the distinction between relations internal to the
representation and relations with a model of the world in terms of D-relations (for
discourse relations) and T-relations (for truth relations). D-relations govern the
way representations may be extended or modified in the course of a discourse.
T-relations involve reference to the world in terms of truth, probability, and
possibility. The same distinction is apparent in the way semantics is defined:
“Essentially, semantics is concerned with the ways the truth values of sentences
depend on the meanings of their parts and the ways the truth values of different
sentences are related” (Gamut, 1991, p. 92). In logic, a fundamental distinction
that goes back to Aristotle is made between the trustworthiness of premises,
which refers to the relation of the premises to the world in terms of truth or
probability; and a logical relation, which guarantees that the trustworthiness of
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The distinction between relations internal to the representation and relations
with a model of the world is also made in linguistic models of discourse—for
example, in the Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) of Kamp and Reyle
(1993), in the Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (SDRT) of Asher
(1993), and in the Logical Descriptive Grammar (LDG) of Van Leusen (2007). In
DRT and SDRT, the meaning of sentences and the integration between sentences
are formally represented in the construction of referents and DRT-conditions
in the DRT-boxes. The relation of the text with the world—in particular, the
assignment of truth values—is achieved in a process called embedding in a model
of the world. In LDG, two processes are distinguished, which we illustrate for
the processing of conjunctions. First, words trigger appropriateness conditions.
In case of a causal conjunction, this condition expresses that in the local context
of interpretation, a causal relation can be derived. The appropriateness condition
is part of the conjunction, and understanding the appropriateness condition
is part of the linguistic processing. Second, the appropriateness condition is
tested against knowledge of the world. The assumption of a causal relation
is then accommodated in the background knowledge of the comprehender. It is
interesting to note that this latter process can occur in two different ways in LDG:
global accommodation and content modification. This distinction corresponds to
our distinction (Noordman & Vonk, 1992; Simons, 1993) between an inference
process by experts (activating available knowledge) versus the inference process
by novices (adding new knowledge).
In summary, we made a distinction between the processes of propositional
integration and world-knowledge inference in understanding because sentences.
Propositional integration refers to the process by which the comprehender es-
tablishes the type of relation between the two clauses or sentences; world-
knowledge inference refers to the process of deriving the general causal relation
and checking it against the comprehender’s world knowledge. In two experi-
ments, evidence was obtained for propositional integration and world-knowledge
inference as two identifiable processes during the understanding of because
sentences. In these experiments, propositional integration occurs as soon as the
second clause is processed, and is facilitated by the presence of the conjunction.
World-knowledge inference occurs as soon as the information in the second
clause is available, and is triggered by the conjunction.
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